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Introduction 
Vulnerable populations in biomedical research have attracted attention in 
research ethics since the creation of the Nurnberg code in 1947. Research 
guidelines establish ethical principles in order to protect vulnerable individuals from 
exploitation in biomedical studies. Vulnerable groups may include women, children, 
the mentally disabled, racial minorities, or refugees. In this thesis, I will focus in 
particular on refugees. The uniqueness of refugees can be defined through their 
сontextuality. Particular, refugees are not just vulnerable individuals who live in the 
same social, cultural and legal contexts with researchers, but they move from the 
context of their home country to another context of the host country, thus bringing 
one context within another. This сontextuality may contribute to additional 
complexities for the inclusion of refugees to a biomedical study.   
The term “refugee” will be applied in this thesis in accordance with the 1967 
Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. It applies to people who 
are “unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group, or political opinion” (United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, 1967). I will explore the consequences that refugees may experience due 
to their entitlement as vulnerable individuals and their particular protection in 
biomedical studies. 
Biomedical research can be determined as “the broad area of science that 
involves the investigation of the biological process and the causes of disease 
through careful experimentation, observation, laboratory work, analysis, and testing” 
(California Biomedical Research Association, 2016). Vulnerability in the context of 
biomedical research is often associated with the capacity of potential research 
subjects to provide voluntary informed consent. Alternatively, vulnerability can be 
defined as the jeopardized ability of autonomous decision-making, where autonomy 
is broadly understood as personal independence (O’Neill, 2002). Although, this 
thesis is focusing on the concept of vulnerability in its application to refugees as 
potential participants of biomedical studies, some of the general arguments about 
the concept of vulnerability in biomedical research can be relevant for other groups 
such as women, children or prisoners.  
Biomedical research involving presumably vulnerable refugees, on the one hand, 
has a potential to advocate for refugees’ health issues, as well as for their right to 
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be considered in health policy (Perry, 2011). On the other hand, however, such 
studies require particular attention, as they have a potential to harm people that are 
already worse off. In addition, refugees have a questionable capacity for 
autonomous reasoning, due to their dependence on others’ mercy. Therefore, 
biomedical studies may exploit refugees’ vulnerability for their own means.   
The concept of the vulnerability of refugees as jeopardized ability of autonomous 
reasoning is the focus of the current thesis. This concept will be analyzed from the 
perspective of the enduring ethical tension between clinical care and public health 
ethics, where the former is focused on individuals and treatments, and the later 
deals with populations and long-term public health goals (Petrini, 2012). There are 
some critical debates regarding the difficulty of the association of research and care, 
and also concerning the important question of trust. However, in this thesis I will 
make an attempt to combine principles of clinical care and public health ethics. 
Although, biomedical studies are usually focused on the benefits of future patients 
and populations, when vulnerable individuals involved in a biomedical research, the 
lack of personal benefits for these participants can be recognized as the exploitation 
of their vulnerability. I will argue that the combination of clinical and public health 
rationales will help to soften the vulnerable position of refugees and help to improve 
both their personal health status and public health policies.   
However, it must be acknowledged that the combination of personal and public 
health benefits within one study increases the risk of a therapeutic misconception of 
research as care. The possibility of this misconception is particularly high in refugee 
research, as most people in refugee camps have never participated in any studies, 
or may have never heard about such studies. To overcome this complexity, I will 
propose a methodological solution that incorporates a participatory approach into 
the process of biomedical studies. However, the combination of research and care 
that often leads to the union of roles of researchers and physicians constitutes a 
serious risk of exploitation of vulnerable refugees and thus requires a critical position 
of refugees towards the research and researchers. I will suggest a reevaluation of 
the position of refugees as silent participants in research to active players in the 
development of research processes. This would, however, require the re-
conceptualization of the presumed vulnerability of refugee populations.  
For the purpose of this thesis, I will focus only on refugees living in asylum centers 
in Western Europe, as I have based my arguments on empirical materials from this 
part of the world. To illustrate the arguments, I will refer to a study where I 
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participated in and conducted a series of interviews with microbiologists, public 
health doctors, nurses and Syrian refugees. This research began in June 2016 and 
is focused on studying the level of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) among Syrian 
refugees in Maastricht, the Netherlands. AMR is an evolutionary development 
process of microorganisms that evolve the ability to withstand antimicrobial drugs, 
thus making the treatment of infections ineffective and raising the risk of spreading 
resistant microorganisms to other people. It is important to note that AMR screening 
for public health purposes is usually conducted among healthy individuals in order 
to understand the overall picture of the ecological community of pathogenic and non-
pathogenic microorganisms. Such screenings do not provide any individual results 
for participants, as these results can neither benefit nor harm them. My role in this 
study was to analyze the attitudes and values that different participants in the 
research had towards AMR. This understanding of different values helped us to 
develop an ethically appropriate framework to work with sensitive questions related 
to the antimicrobial resistance of refugees.  
The thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter gives an overview of the 
concept of autonomy and the way this concept has been constructed in medical 
ethics. I will show how the concept of vulnerability, which indicates certain risks for 
autonomy, has been shaped in research ethics. The second chapter is devoted to 
an in-depth analysis of the concept of vulnerability in biomedical research, its 
rationale, and its limitations. In this chapter, the focus will be on the Belmont Report 
as one of the most important documents that defines an ethical framework for 
biomedical studies and gives an explicit definition of vulnerability. The chapter looks 
through the motivation and reasoning for establishing the concept of vulnerability 
and provides a critical analysis of its limitations. In the third chapter, I will discuss 
the concept of vulnerability and its re-definition by three groups of scholars: Hurst 
(2008), Lange et al. (2013), and Luna (2009). These authors propose context-
sensitive understandings of vulnerability that expand beyond its definition in the 
Belmont Report. I will critically synthesize the three approaches of these authors 
and emphasize the necessity of looking at the design of biomedical research itself. 
In this chapter, I will argue for the benefits of participatory methodology. The fourth 
chapter will give a detailed overview of participatory methodology and of its 
adaptation in anthropology and learning health system. In the fifth and conclusive 
chapter, I will analyze what possibilities and limitations participatory methodology 
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can bring to biomedical research involving refugees and propose my own design for 
conducting such studies.   
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Chapter 1. Respect for autonomy: foundations of the principle 
Before examining the concept of vulnerability in biomedical research, we first 
have to understand the origin of this concept. As was mentioned in the introduction, 
vulnerability in biomedical research is often associated with the ability of potential 
research participants to provide voluntary informed consent (to understand 
information, to judge it according to one’s values, and to express voluntary consent). 
This ability is rooted in persons’ capacity to exercise their autonomy and to make 
autonomous decisions. Therefore, vulnerability in biomedical research can be 
defined as certain risks associated with the expression of such autonomous 
decisions, or as a jeopardized ability to exercise one’s autonomy.  
The word autonomy refers to the Greek “autos” and “nomos” that was primarily 
understood as self-rule or self-law and that was associated with the governance of 
an autonomous state. Therefore, autonomous individuals are those who act 
according to their own laws and rules. Vulnerable people, by contrast, are those 
who feel threatened if they act according to their own rules and desires, and who's 
autonomy is therefore influenced by others. In medical ethics, respect for the 
autonomous choices of persons is recognized as one of the main principles in 
conducting biomedical studies involving human subjects. This principle aligns with 
the principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice, which were introduced 
and thoroughly analyzed by scholars Beauchamp & Childress in their famous book 
"Principles of Biomedical Ethics" (2009). Respect for autonomy, according to  
Beauchamp & Childress (2009: 103), encompasses respect for autonomous agents 
and acknowledgment of “their right to hold views, to make choices, and to take 
actions based on their personal values and beliefs”.  
 Beauchamp & Childress (2009) introduced four principles of biomedical ethics, 
including the respect for autonomy, which may be seen as a classic ethical 
framework for biomedical studies. However, the contemporary understanding of the 
principle of respect for autonomy has been largely influenced and shaped by the 
classic works of Kant (1785) and Mill (1859). In the following chapter, I will give a 
short overview of the basic definitions of autonomy given by Kant and Mill. Then, 
referring to the definition provided by Beauchamp & Childress (2009), I will show 
how a classical understanding of autonomy has been adopted in medical ethics, 
and how it can help us to frame the question of vulnerability.  
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Kant argued (1785) that respect for autonomy entails treatment of people as ends 
in themselves rather than as means. In his work on the metaphysics of morals, Kant 
(1785) provided the following definition for the principle of autonomy: “Not to choose 
otherwise than so that the maxims of one’s choice are at the same time 
comprehended with it in the same volition as universal law.” According to Kant, all 
autonomous agents have unconditional worth within themselves and can 
individually recognize their moral destiny. Therefore, a violation of autonomy means 
that a person has been treated merely as means in accordance with others’ goals 
and beliefs.  
Kant argued that people have rational powers and that this is the reason that 
motivates human beings to act morally. People are able to establish moral rules for 
themselves because of reason. However, the moral worth of an individual’s actions 
does not depend exclusively on personal rules, but also on the moral acceptability 
of these individual rules on which an individual acts. According to Kant, the actions 
of individuals are autonomous only if they are based on the universal moral 
principles, which correspond to the categorical imperative. Kant formulated the 
categorical imperative as follows: “I ought never to conduct myself except so that I 
could also will that my maxim become a universal law” (Kant, 1785). It is important 
to acknowledge that Kant’s theory of autonomy is exclusively focused on moral self-
determination, while the principle of autonomy in medical ethics is generally about 
self-determination. 
Mill was a hedonistic utilitarian, as he understands utility through the increase of 
happiness or pleasure. According to Mill, autonomy has an indissoluble connection 
with “individuality” of persons, he argued that “the cultivation of individuality… 
produces…well-developed human beings” (Mill, 1869, cited 2001: 59). An individual 
autonomous agent should act freely according to agent’s personal mode of values, 
as long as they do not interfere with others’ expressions of freedom and do not do 
any harm to others. In his work “On Liberty”, Mill (1869, cited 2001: 63) stated the 
following: “If a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and 
experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is 
the best in itself, but because it is his own mode”. Although Mill (1869) argued that 
individuals should act according to their own beliefs, fhe also emphasized that 
society has to use its mechanisms of pressure and persuasion when individuals 
demonstrate inconsiderate or false beliefs.  
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Although the concepts of autonomy provided by Kant and Mill were of central 
importance to the formulation of ethical principles in biomedical research and care, 
they have number of limitations that have to be considered. According to Mill, 
persons should and can act according to their own ideals, even if these actions may 
harm them. For instance, a healthy individual may wish to participate in a clinical 
trial on hepatitis and, for this reason, may ask researchers to infect him with this 
virus. Although this person makes his own autonomous decision to be infected with 
hepatitis, it would be unethical for researchers to satisfy this request, because it may 
cause this person unnecessary harm or even death. In this hypothetical example of 
a biomedical study, the principle of autonomy, as defined by Mill, would conflict with 
the principle of non-maleficence that requires avoiding harm.   
Kant’s theory of autonomy has been the most influential for the formulation of the 
principle of respect for autonomous choices in medical ethics. However, this theory 
is limited when it comes to persons’ motivations for participate in biomedical studies. 
According to Kant, only actions driven by moral duty can be seen as autonomous 
actions, while actions performed on the basis of emotions, such as sympathy or 
love, do not have equal moral worth. For instance, a healthy individual made a 
decision to participate in a clinical trial on cancer because his wife was diagnosed 
with leukemia. He made this decision based on the emotions of love to his wife and 
the desire to help. In this case, it can be said that the decision to participate in the 
clinical trial was based on emotions and therefore would not correspond to the 
Kantian theory of autonomy. Therefore, to justify the participation of individuals in 
biomedical studies, which are usually focused on the health of future generations, 
we should argue that such participation is driven by moral duty. This argument can 
be seen as a challenge. On the one hand, we could say that participation in 
biomedical research cannot be driven by moral duty, as such studies often use 
participants as means rather than ends in and of themselves. Thus, biomedical 
studies would not be justified by the Kantian theory. On the other hand, we can also 
argue that the current population has a moral duty to future generations to preserve 
the ecology of the planet, the environment, and also scientific knowledge. It could 
be said that through participation in biomedical studies, today’s society fulfill their 
obligations to future generations. Following this argument, we can apply Kant’s 
theory of autonomy to individuals’ autonomous decisions to take part in biomedical 
research.  
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According to Kant, we cannot treat other individuals as means to our ends. That 
does not necessarily mean that Kant would not justify participation in biomedical 
research. What is important for Kant’s notion of autonomy is that during research 
human participants are treated with respect and dignity as ends in themselves. 
There is, however, an important distinction between Kant’s understanding of 
autonomy and the principle of autonomy that has been widely accepted in research 
ethics and will be discussed in the current thesis. It is important to acknowledge that 
Kant speaks about moral autonomy that is rooted in one’s own moral reasoning. 
While in research ethics developed by Beauchamp & Childress (2009) and in the 
Belmont report that will be discussed later, principle of autonomy is associated with 
decisional autonomy that refers to the decision-making capacity of potential 
research subjects. Since this thesis is partially focusing on the definition of 
vulnerability stated in the Belmont report, I will follow the definition of decisional 
rather than moral autonomy. 
Following the concepts of Kant and Mill, Beauchamp & Childress (2009) propose 
a practical definition of the principle of respect for autonomy, which can be applied 
in medical ethics. The authors state that for an action to be autonomous persons 
have to “act (1) intentionally, (2) with understanding and (3) without controlling 
influences that determine their action” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009: 101). In the 
context of biomedical research, prospective subjects have the capacity to make 
autonomous decisions, if they are able to understand provided information, make 
judgments regarding this information in accordance with their own values, and are 
able to communicate their values and preferences with researchers. This definition 
of an autonomous person determines particular elements that have to be 
incorporated into the process of informed consent. These elements include:  
 Disclosure. An initial intention and an idea of informed consent requires 
the disclosure of substantially relevant research information to patients. 
Patients will then be able to autonomously authorize their participation in 
a biomedical study. It is important to note that informed consent does not 
mean to provide full information about biomedical research, but rather to 
provide necessary, substantial information for patients to make their 
autonomous decisions. However, the provision of medical information 
does not simultaneously guarantees persons an understanding of this 
information.  
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 Understanding. Beauchamp & Childress (2009: 127) point out that 
“persons understand if they have acquired pertinent information and have 
relevant belief about the nature and consequences of their actions.” An 
understanding of pertinent information depends on the competence of a 
particular patient. Competence can be understood as “the ability to 
perform [a] task”, and the ability to judge acquired information. Therefore, 
for actions to be autonomous individuals have to express a substantial 
degree of understanding. However, understanding depends on a particular 
ability, whose criteria “vary from context to context” (Beauchamp & 
Childress, 2009: 112). For example, a refugee may be incompetent at 
making a decision about his participation in a biomedical study just after 
his arrival to a host country. This is because of the stress and uncertainty 
he may face in an asylum center. This does not mean that he will remain 
incompetent at making this decision after 2-3 years of living in a host 
country and getting used to its infrastructure and environment.    
 Voluntariness is another very important feature of informed consent. An 
action is voluntary only if a person acts without being controlled by another 
person’s influences. An important factor must be emphasized here. 
Although it may seem that voluntariness is equal to autonomy, 
voluntariness only encompasses “the condition of control by other 
individuals” (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009: 132). In practice a person’s 
actions are neither purely voluntary, nor fully informed or autonomous, 
because of the cultural norms, beliefs, and social factors that influence a 
person’s decision-making. It does not, however, follow that a person’s 
actions are never adequately informed, voluntary, or autonomous. 
According to Beauchamp & Childress (2009: 103), the principle of  respect for 
autonomy “involves acknowledging the value and decision-making rights of persons 
and enabling them to act autonomously, whereas disrespect for autonomy involves 
attitudes and actions that ignore, insult, demean, or are inattentive to others’ rights 
of autonomous action.” Following Kant’s definition of autonomy, the authors explain 
that the principle of respect for autonomous decisions can be understood as both a 
positive and a negative obligation. As a negative obligation, a researcher has to 
respect the autonomous decisions expressed by participants and treat them with 
dignity. As a positive obligation, respect for autonomy implies that researchers have 
obligations to both treat participants with dignity and take actions in order to 
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encourage autonomous decision-making. However, Beauchamp & Childress (2009) 
are cautions in defining the principle of respect for autonomy as a positive obligation 
in the context of biomedical research. They emphasize that researchers should be 
careful in their attempts to foster autonomous decision-making, as these attempts 
can lead to a strong form of paternalism that may actually result in coercion and 
violation of an individual’s autonomy. In addition, as Beauchamp & Childress (2009) 
emphasize, in order to foster someone’s decision-making ability, researchers must 
be familiar with factors that influence one’s decision-making. Such factors, however, 
may lay beyond the context of research or clinical care and thus researchers cannot 
know and do not have an obligation to know these nuances.  
Although Beauchamp & Childress' (2009) definition of the principle of respect for 
autonomy has become a classic in medical and biomedical ethics, there is an 
important criticism to this concept. For instance, Hayry (2005: 31) argues that 
respect for autonomy, that he defines in accordance with Kant as an individual self-
determination rooted in rationality, can restrict freedom, which he understands as 
“non-restriction of options”. Therefore, Hayry (2005) suggests to shift from the 
respect for autonomy to respect for freedom that he sees as a more liberal concept. 
An important criticism has been provided by feminist scholars who have highlighted 
that principle of respect for autonomy established by Beauchamp & Childress 
“overemphasizes people’s independence” (Ells, 2001: 218). Ells (2001) argues that 
Beauchamp and Childress apply their principle of autonomy to individuals whom 
they recognize as “fundamentally” equal, while ignoring their contextuallity and 
interdependency. In addition, developments in social psychology emphasize the 
narrowness of this definition. A psychological approach insists on understanding the 
principle of respect for autonomy as a positive obligation. Proponents of this 
argument propose rethinking the principle of respect for autonomy with an emphasis 
on the social context of the autonomous agents. They also argue that researchers 
have an obligation “to enhance certain positive conditions that are likely to generate 
autonomous, or more autonomous reasoning” (Stoljar, 2008: 16).  
According to a psychological concept of autonomy, medical researchers have to 
focus on the social contexts and physiological states of potential participants, and, 
if needed, they are obliged not only to respect the autonomy of individuals, but also 
to generate autonomous reasoning. Following this approach when constructing the 
process of informed consent, researchers have to take into consideration the social 
backgrounds of potential participants. For example, when conducting studies in rural 
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areas or involving illiterate populations, researchers must assure that they are able 
to communicate with participants using adequate terminology. This understanding 
of autonomy obligates researchers to be informed about the social and family 
situations of potential participants, and to be able to recognize whether these people 
belong to an oppressed group (e.g. race, class or gender). Therefore, researchers 
must be aware of the social, cultural, and family influences on participants’ 
autonomy and must try to enhance individuals’ ability for autonomous reasoning and 
decision-making.  
On the one hand, the principle of respect for autonomy proposed by Beauchamp 
& Childress (2009) emphasizes that the ability of individuals to make autonomous 
decisions is one of the major ethical principles in biomedical research. According to 
these authors, while researchers have to respect an individual’s autonomy, they do 
not have an obligation to strengthen the ability of a person to make autonomous 
decisions. Therefore, the authors understand the principle of respect for autonomy 
as a negative, rather than as a positive obligation. On the other hand, the 
psychological approach aims to expand researchers’ obligations towards respect for 
a person’s autonomy, by taking into consideration the complex social and 
psychological conditions of each individual. Although the psychological approach 
aims to understand the principle of autonomy as a positive obligation, it does not 
provide a solution to the concern about hard paternalism. How far should 
researchers go to enhance participants’ ability to make autonomous decisions? 
What kind of guidelines should exist to define social conditions that may influence 
persons’ decision-making? How can researchers, who themselves live within a 
particular social framework, identify and judge social influences on other human 
beings?  
In conclusion, beginning with a classical understanding, the  concept of autonomy 
in medical ethics has been shaped by different developments in ethics and social 
sciences. In order to make the definition of autonomy more applicable to the current 
complexities of biomedical studies, Beauchamp & Childress (2009) argue for the 
adequate autonomy of research participants. This autonomy should entail that 
potential subjects have a sufficient understanding and ability to make decisions 
regarding their participation in research. Vulnerability in this context would mean a 
jeopardized ability of potential research subjects to exercise an adequate level of 
autonomy due to coercion by or the influences of other individuals. Although the 
psychological approach suggests that researchers should take actions to enhance 
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participants’ ability to make autonomous decisions, it does not suggest a possible 
methodology or guideline that researchers should follow to take these actions.  
The concept of vulnerability as the jeopardized ability of autonomous decision-
making has been adopted by most of the ethical guidelines for biomedical studies 
involving human subjects, including the Belmont Report. In the next chapter, I will 
demonstrate how the contemporary definition of autonomy and the subsequent 
definition of vulnerability developed by Beauchamp & Childress (2009) were 
translated and adopted in the Belmont Report. I will show the possibilities and 
limitations of the Belmont Report with relation to research involving vulnerable 
populations. In addition, I will propose a way to develop the proposition of the 
psychological approach, in order to enhance persons’ ability to act autonomously 
without arriving at hard paternalism. 
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Chapter 2. Concept of vulnerability in research ethics 
The ethical framework of research involving human subjects has been 
determined by several ethical guidelines, established at different times in reaction 
to particular events in the history of clinical trials. The first of these guidelines was 
the Nuremberg Code established in 1947 in order to protect people participating in 
research. This code was a reaction to the horrifying experiments that were 
conducted by Nazis during the Second World War. Although the Nuremberg Code 
was an important stage in the development of research ethics, it was not significant 
enough to prevent several infamous trials, such as the Tuskegee Study1 or the 
hepatitis trial with mentally disabled children (Robinson & Unruh, 2008).  The next 
step in the development of research ethics was the creation of the Declaration of 
Helsinki in 1964. The Declaration established strict requirements for informed 
consent in research involving human subject and focused on the protection of 
individuals. These developments provided an important foundation for the 
establishment of the Belmont Report in 1978. This was the first document that 
formulated the three ethical principles that are currently used in medical ethics: 
respect for persons, beneficence, and justice (Miracle, 2016).  
The Belmont Report was developed in the US by the National Commission for 
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The 
context in which this document was developed is of great importance. The Tuskegee 
Study was one of the most blatant and controversial medical trials of that time. As a 
consequence, one of the main concerns of the National Commission was to protect 
individual participants from possible coercion in research. The central focus of the 
commission was on the autonomy of persons. In addition, they had the particular 
task of distinguishing clinical practices from research practices, in order to avoid a 
therapeutic misconception that might eventually lead to exploitation. Three ethical 
principles were developed to allow the ethical performance of biomedical research. 
It is important that the Belmont Report is not a philosophical paper that aimed to 
contribute to the discussion of ethical principles. Instead, as noted by Joneson, one 
                                                          
1 ‘In 1932, the Public Health Service, working with the Tuskegee Institute, began a study to record the natural history of 
syphilis in hopes of justifying treatment programs for blacks. It was called the "Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in 
the Negro Male”. The study initially involved 600 black men – 399 with syphilis, 201 who did not have the disease. The 
study was conducted without the benefit of patients' informed consent. Researchers told the men they were being 
treated for "bad blood," a local term used to describe several ailments, including syphilis, anemia, and fatigue. In truth, 
they did not receive the proper treatment needed to cure their illness. In exchange for taking part in the study, the men 
received free medical exams, free meals, and burial insurance. Although originally projected to last 6 months, the study 
actually went on for 40 years’ (Center for Disease, Control and Prevention, 2015).   
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of the report’s developers,  “it was a proclamation that had to ring true in the ears of 
scientists, policymakers, politicians, ethicists, journalists, and judges” (Jonsen, 
2005: 5).  
Interestingly, Beauchamp, one of the authors previously mentioned, played a 
major role in the development of the Belmont Report. He was invited as a staff 
philosopher to write the “Belmont Paper” and to develop its three ethical principles 
at the same time as he was writing his book with Childress. Therefore, as he himself 
noted, these two papers co-influenced each other (Beauchamp, 2005). However, 
Beauchamp (2005: 15) cautiously notes that the book with Childress is 
philosophically grounded, while the principles established in the Belmont Report are 
largely associated with “our cultural tradition” and are rooted in “common morality”. 
He emphasizes that the report and the book have “substantially different moral 
visions” (Beauchamp, 2005: 15). In particular, the principle of autonomy in the 
Belmont Report is mixed with a principle of protection for non-autonomous 
individuals. Additionally, the Belmont Report does not distinguish between the 
principles of non-maleficence and beneficence, while Beauchamp & Childress 
(2009) emphasize the importance of this separation. Nevertheless, this interesting 
coincidence may help us to better understand the basis for the development of the 
Belmont Report.  
Although the Belmont Report is not a philosophical paper, but rather practice-
oriented, the report aims to shape the process of biomedical research in order to 
protect research subjects from possible harms they may experience during 
research. Therefore, in this thesis I will discuss the Belmont Report as an important 
document that creates an ethical framework for biomedical studies involving human 
subjects. It obliges researchers to provide all of the significant information to 
potential participants in order to obtain voluntary informed consent and avoid 
coercion and exploitation. Another important feature of the Belmont Report, and the 
reason why I discuss this particular document, is that it was the first document that 
used and discussed the concept of vulnerability in the context of biomedical 
research.  
The report characterizes vulnerable people as those who: 
(1) Lack the capacity to give voluntary informed consent;  
(2) Have a high possibility of being exploited in research; 
(3) Have increased risk of being harmed through the research process (Rogers 
et al., 2012).  
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According to this document, vulnerable groups include, but are not restricted to, 
“racial minorities, the economically disadvantaged, the very sick, and the 
institutionalized,” whose “dependent status and their frequently compromised 
capacity for free consent” require particular protection when these groups are 
involved in research (National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biome Beha Resea, & Ryan, 1978).  
Although the Belmont Report was a significant stage in the development of 
research ethics, its concept of vulnerability has a number of limitations. Based on 
the presence or absence of the aforementioned characteristics, the Belmont Report 
determines population groups as vulnerable or not, a method of defining 
vulnerability that has been called “labeling” (Luna, 2009). The practice of labeling 
presupposes that there are fixed and presumed conditions (e.g. an ability to provide 
informed consent) that a population group has to fulfill to be recognized as 
vulnerable or non-vulnerable, yet disregards possible differences within this group.   
The practice of labeling in research ethics has been criticized by various scholars 
for being both too narrow and too broad in its application of the concept of 
vulnerability. It is too narrow because it defines vulnerable populations largely based 
on people’s ability to give voluntary informed consent. Therefore, the protection of 
vulnerable populations can be achieved through improving the process of informed 
consent. Rogers et al. (2012: 15) explain, however, that “if this is not possible [to 
improve the process of informed consent], participants deemed vulnerable are 
excluded from research altogether.” Based on this assumption, many population 
groups, such as children, the mentally ill, and the socially and economically 
disadvantaged (such as refugees) may be excluded from biomedical research and 
from the benefits these studies may bring to their health and wellbeing. 
Other scholars, such as Hurst (2008),  Levine et al. (2004), and Luna (2009) 
emphasize that the practice of labeling used in the Belmont Report is too broad in 
its application of vulnerability. As was noted above, a population group is recognized 
as vulnerable if it meets certain conditions, such as an inability to give voluntary 
informed consent, or a high possibility of being harmed in the research process. 
However, this definition of vulnerability may be applied to almost any research 
participant. For example, elderly people may have a higher risk of harm in 
biomedical research because of their age; students may be recognized as lacking 
the ability to give voluntary informed consent because of their economic 
dependency. As Levine et al. (2004: 46) rightly noted, however, if everyone is 
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vulnerable then the concept of vulnerability no longer has force. Therefore, it loses 
its capacity to protect those who are actually vulnerable and require protection.  
In addition, Nickel (2006) demonstrates a contradiction in the principles that the 
Belmont Report establishes in order to protect vulnerable populations. The principle 
of respect for autonomy entails that research participants be treated as autonomous 
individuals and that their participation in research be determined by their capacity to 
provide voluntary informed consent. If a person has difficulty providing informed 
consent then researchers have an obligation to ensure special protection for this 
person and to establish required safeguards. For example, if a research participant 
is a child then informed consent has to be obtained through the child’s official 
surrogates. In this context, “vulnerable populations are those whose capacity to 
safeguard their own interests, by autonomously giving (or refusing) informed 
consent, is compromised” (Nickel, 2006: 247).  
Another principle is fairness or justice, which is expressed in the Belmont Report 
(1978) as follows: 
[T]he selection of research subjects needs to be scrutinized in order to determine whether some 
classes (e.g., welfare patients, particular racial and ethnic minorities, or persons confined to 
institutions) are being systematically selected simply because of their easy availability, their 
compromised position, or their manipulability, rather than for reasons directly related to the 
problem being studied. 
This definition means that it would be unjust to involve individuals who are already 
burdened by society and for whom the benefits of this research would not outweigh 
the additional harms that this study may impose on them in biomedical research. 
Following this definition of justice, Nickel (2006: 248) points out that vulnerable 
people would be those who:  
[I]n the absence of protections, would be more likely to take on the burdens of participation in 
research in virtue of some feature they share as a group, where this is not compensated by other 
suitably related benefits that accrue to the group.  
However, these two principles give rise to a contradiction of paternalistic attitudes 
in the Belmont Report. Specifically, as the Belmont Report tries to protect vulnerable 
populations in biomedical research, it simultaneously contributes to their exclusion 
from research and thus from the benefits of participation in a study. Nickel (2006: 
248) expresses this argument in the following:  
Just as it is bad to target a badly off group because of its vulnerability, it is also bad to avoid a 
group completely. When some group is avoided, it thereby fails to receive, as a whole, a benefit 
that might otherwise accrue to it, while comparable benefits are accruing to others. 
Therefore, the concept of vulnerability presented in the Belmont Report has 
several complexities that arise when applying this concept in practice.  
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 First, the concept of vulnerability may be seen as too narrow, as it reduces 
the notion of vulnerability to a specific aspect of some population groups, 
while ignoring the possible features of research that may be harmful for 
some research participants.  
 Second, the concept of vulnerability may be understood as too broad as it 
labels a large number of population groups as intrinsically vulnerable 
without taking into account different research contexts that may make the 
same people vulnerable in one context and non-vulnerable in another. 
 Third, the definitions of vulnerability presented in the Belmont Report 
contradict each other in that they require protection for vulnerable 
populations, while also depriving them of the rights of participation in 
biomedical research.  
The Belmont Report was the first document that applied the concept of 
vulnerability to biomedical research. However, more recent and influential ethical 
guidelines for biomedical research have also used this concept. For instance, the 
edited version of the Declaration of Helsinki (2013) has two references to 
vulnerability. One is regarding the special protection of vulnerable populations, and 
the second is regarding the possible benefits and harms that research may impose 
on its participants. Referring to vulnerable populations, The Declaration of Helsinki 
describes them as those who “may have an increased likelihood of being wronged 
or of incurring additional harm” (World Medical Association, 2013: 4).  
Another ethical guideline for biomedical research involving human subjects was 
developed by the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences 
(CIOMS). It provides a more comprehensive definition of vulnerability: 
“Vulnerability” refers to a substantial incapacity to protect one’s own interests owing to such 
impediments as lack of capability to give informed consent, lack of alternative means of obtaining 
medical care or other expensive necessities, or being a junior or subordinate member of a 
hierarchical group. Accordingly, special provision must be made for the protection of the rights 
and welfare of vulnerable persons (CIOMS, 2002: 18). 
One specific feature of the aforementioned guidelines, including the Belmont 
Report, is that they understand vulnerability as an embodied characteristic of a 
social group. This makes vulnerability an unavoidable and intrinsic condition of a 
particular population group, such as pregnant women, children, elderly people, and 
refugees, without differentiating between different socio-political, environmental, 
and thus research contexts.   
However, labeling a whole population group as vulnerable in order to protect this 
group can actually bring about more harm than benefit. One of the classic examples 
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of such harms is the exclusion of women from participating in biomedical research 
because of their “pregnable” bodies, as expressed by Merton (1994). In order to 
protect women and their future children and to avoid possible harm to women and 
potential (or current) fetuses that may be caused by research, women and pregnant 
women have been intentionally excluded from participation in biomedical studies. 
This problem only gained serious attention in the late 1990s. This exclusion as a 
form of protection has resulted in a lack of important medical knowledge regarding 
women’s health, and the lack of important medications for women and pregnant 
women, as most studies have been conducted on men. Therefore, all of the medical 
information and medications derived from these studies were based on men’s 
anatomy.  
Similar to the exclusion of women from biomedical research, we currently face 
the exclusion of refugees and asylum seekers in biomedical research, once again 
for the sake of their protection. In his article, Gifford (2013) describes his experience 
of communicating with an ethical committee that makes decisions regarding ethics 
in biomedical research based on the aforementioned guidelines. Gifford and his 
colleagues received a rejection from this ethical committee for their pilot project with 
refugee youth. The main objection was regarding the questions that the researchers 
were planning to use to investigate the best application of scaled items - “How much 
do you like ice cream?” and “Given a choice between ice cream and pizza, which 
would you chose first?”  The ethics committee objected that references to food might 
provoke re-traumatization of refugee youth who had experienced starvation.  
The HREC [Human Research Ethics Committee] judged these questions as having the potential 
to cause harm to resettled refugee youth because they were refugee. The logic was that being 
refugees, these youths would have experienced starvation and like other forms of trauma, 
questions about food were seen as a risk to re-traumatise (Gifford, 2013: 42).  
After meeting with this committee and explaining to them that “although all of the 
youth had a refugee past, they also were like other teenagers who enjoyed sweets 
and ‘junk’ food”, Gifford and colleagues received approval for their study (Gifford, 
2013: 42). In this case, the ethics committee perceived refugee youth as a group, 
characterized by conditions of suffering, pain, starvation and other miseries that may 
be associated with forced migration, while ignoring their non-refugee experience as 
less important. As we can see from this example, one of the complexities that may 
arise in biomedical research involving refugees is that refugees may be associated 
with the concept of suffering; they are understood by ethical guidelines and thus by 
ethical committee as intrinsically vulnerable. This understanding of refugees as 
intrinsically vulnerable because of their belonging to a group of forced migrants may 
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silence people’s experiences of the ordinary lives that they had before migration, 
and thus their capacity for making autonomous decisions on their behalf.  
Despite possible complexities with inclusion of refugees in biomedical studies, 
research, as was highlighted in the introduction, may be seen as an important 
instrument to advocate for refugees’ health issues. For example, research on 
antimicrobial resistance (AMR) can have two possible outcomes. First, refugee 
populations can have the same or lower level of antimicrobial resistance compared 
to the local population. These data can promote the de-stigmatization of refugees 
as a dangerous group that spreads diseases, an image that is often exploited by 
radical political parties. Similar results have already been obtained in the 
Netherlands after the screening of Syrian refugees for tuberculosis (TB). The results 
of the screening showed that incoming Syrian refugees have the same level of TB 
as the local population in the Netherlands. As a result of this study, Syrian refugees 
do not go through obligatory TB screenings when they arrive to the Netherlands 
(National Institute for Public Health and the Environment, 2016). The second 
possible outcome of AMR research is that refugees may have higher levels of 
antimicrobial resistance than the local population. These data can affect the practice 
guidelines for medical practitioners by correcting the treatment procedures that are 
usually used for particular medical conditions, as this treatment would not be 
effective for refugees who may have resistant genes. Therefore, research can 
improve the quality of provided health care for refugees, by taking into account their 
unique conditions.  
This chapter scrutinized the concept of vulnerability as it is presented in the 
official guidelines for biomedical research involving human subjects, with a specific 
focus on the Belmont Report. I looked at the labeling and often contradictory nature 
of the concept of vulnerability presented in the report. I then mapped possible 
difficulties in the application of the concept. It is important to note that I do not deny 
the importance of the Belmont Report and I do not propose abandoning it. The focus 
of this thesis is the concept of vulnerability in research ethics. In the following 
chapters, I will propose a way to rethink this concept in order to enrich the Belmont 
Report and to benefit potentially vulnerable refugees as research subjects. In the 
next chapter, I will focus on an in-depth critique of the labeling concept of 
vulnerability and propose a rethinking of the concept in order to make it more 
sensitive to research contexts.  
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Chapter 3. Rethinking vulnerability as a context-dependent 
concept 
The labeling application of vulnerability has been widely criticized by different 
scholars who propose a re-evaluation of this concept in a context-dependent, 
flexible, and participatory way. In this chapter, I will follow the arguments of the 
following scholars: Luna (2009), Lange et al. (2013), and Hurst (2008). These 
authors provide the most flexible approach to vulnerability in biomedical research. 
They combine the requirements of the Belmont Report for both an autonomy driven 
process of informed consent and protection of research subjects with a more 
context-sensitive definition of vulnerability. This flexibility in defining vulnerability 
would allow us to incorporate practices of participation into the process of research 
and to contribute to the enhancement of participants’ autonomy. In addition, based 
on this context-sensitive definition of vulnerability, I will propose a solution to the 
critique of the psychological approach discussed in the first chapter.  
Luna (2009) proposes the idea of “layers of vulnerability,” which implies a 
relational analysis between a person and the circumstances s/he lives in. The author 
argues that depending on the research situation and research protocol that reflect 
the social and political contexts of a study, the same population groups may be 
exposed to different vulnerabilities. For example, a Sudanese refugee living in a 
camp in a rural area of Nigeria has very different layers of vulnerability than a 
Sudanese refugee living in a camp in Germany. Therefore, these two people, 
although they both belong to a refugee group, live in different environments and, 
therefore, are exposed to different vulnerabilities. While a refugee in Nigeria may 
have very limited access to food and clean water, a refugee in Germany almost 
never encounters these problems. Thus, different safeguards are needed if refugee 
research is performed in Nigeria or in Germany, as refugees living in these countries 
face different vulnerabilities. Luna (2009: 123) emphasizes that “not everybody is 
alike”, therefore, it would be too simplistic to rely on the labeling practices of defining 
vulnerable populations. There is a need for a different approach, which would 
ensure that vulnerability is acknowledged in research and vulnerable populations 
are protected.   
However, the concept of layers of vulnerability also has some limitations. In 
particular, it will be a task for researchers to define these layers and establish 
particular safeguards to protect vulnerable individuals. In the same way as research 
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subjects, researchers also live in particular contexts and think using certain 
definitions. Depending on the angle from which researchers look at the research 
participants and the contexts they live in, participants’ layers of vulnerability may 
vary. For example, in our study of AMR, microbiologists expressed a clear public 
health orientation in biomedical research involving refugees. Therefore, the angle 
from which they judged the vulnerability of refugees was initially determined by 
public health discourse. These microbiologists determined that the aim of AMR 
research is to explore and decrease possible risks for public health. They argued 
that results from AMR research can benefit health care practices by providing 
evidence regarding mechanisms of antimicrobial resistance and risk factors that 
influence acquisition of AMR. One of the microbiologists explained,  
 It is useful to have some background information about the risk levels within our community, or 
within our region. … If we find that MRSA [resistant bacteria] is high in refugees that would 
necessitate hospitals to deal with them in the same way as with people who spent some time 
abroad or who were admitted to a hospital in a foreign country – isolate them, screen them, and 
treat them if necessary (Microbiologists, group interview). 
Following this argument, microbiologists did not see that the study itself could 
harm refugees in certain ways. Therefore, they did not perceive refugees as 
vulnerable in this particular study. The microbiologists expressed the necessity of 
involving healthy refugees in AMR research, because it would benefit public health. 
At the same time, they noticed some difficulties that could arise from the political 
discourse surrounding this group of people. One of our participants emphasized that 
stigmas surrounding refugees already existed, constructed and supported by 
political discourse. Therefore, if we perform biomedical research involving refugees, 
we will have to deal with political stigma anyway.  
It is societal and political stigma, which is the problem, and not microbiological stigma of the 
research. I understand that every activity can increase a risk, but it is really the political stigma 
that is the underlying problem. The study and the publicity around this study merely ‘uncovers’ 
the stigma that is already there (Scientist, 63). 
Interestingly, the only layer of vulnerability that microbiologists defined was the 
stigmatized political position of refugees. They did not consider risks related to 
therapeutic misconceptions, or to refugees’ (mis)understanding of the concept of 
antimicrobial resistance, as well as possible mistrust by refugees of researchers as 
representatives of a host country.   
Another example may be the position of nurses, their way of looking at refugees, 
and their possible participation in biomedical studies. Nurses’ perspectives on 
biomedical research can be seen through a person-oriented approach. An important 
difference is that nurses, in contrast to microbiologists, take a clinical care 
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perspective and thus focus on the interests of actual research participants, and not 
merely on the possible benefits for future generations.  
In the study on antimicrobial resistance in Maastricht, I conducted a group 
interview with two public health nurses who have experience of both working as 
practicing nurses and working with public health programs. One of the 
characteristics of antimicrobial resistance research on healthy individuals is that it 
does not provide any individual results, as these results cannot benefit or harm 
research participants. This research has a strictly public health orientation and aims 
to develop practical guidelines in accordance with the explored microbiota that is 
“the ecological community of commensal, symbiotic, and pathogenic 
microorganisms that literally share our body space” (Lederberg, 2001). However, 
because this type of research does not have any personal benefits for participants, 
nurses were strictly against the screening of healthy individuals. 
The population is not ill at the refugee center; there is no need to do screening. It [antimicrobial 
resistance] does not do anything with healthy people. … If you test them at a refugee center, what 
would you do? You can’t do anything with this knowledge, you can’t treat them (Public health 
nurses, group interview). 
Different angles of judging a research study may produce different layers of 
vulnerability for research participants. Depending on those who make the decision 
about the layers of vulnerability of potential participants, these layers may be 
different. Therefore, although the concept of layers seems attractive for its flexibility, 
this constitutes the risk of focusing on one vulnerability while ignoring others, 
depending on the perspective the researchers will follow. 
A similar concept has been developed by Lange et al. (2013) who argue that 
vulnerability has three major sources: inherent, situational, and pathogenic.  
 Inherent sources of vulnerability are a nearly inevitable characteristic of all 
humans as needy and dependent beings. This is similar to embodied, 
unavoidable vulnerability.  
 Situational sources determine specific contexts that make people 
vulnerable to something at a particular time or place. For example, a 
surgeon working in a clinic in Estonia in 2016 is not vulnerable to being 
killed by a bombing, while the same surgeon working in a clinic in Aleppo, 
Syria, in 2016 is vulnerable to such an incident.  
 Pathogenic sources of vulnerability arise from “dysfunctional personal or 
social relationships” (Lange et al., 2013: 336). This implies different 
situations of abuse, prejudices, or political injustices and violence. Also, 
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pathogenic vulnerabilities include situations that were described above 
regarding the position of women in biomedical research, when particular 
paternalistic prejudices towards women exclude them from the possible 
benefits of biomedical research.  
The authors do not propose a particular definition of vulnerability, but they define 
three sources that aim to sensitize different aspects of vulnerability. According to 
Lange et al. (2013), researchers have an obligation to ensure that research does 
not exacerbate or create new vulnerabilities among people involved in a study. The 
sources of vulnerabilities proposed by these authors serve as an instrument for 
researchers to recognize vulnerabilities and to protect potential participants, if 
needed. Interestingly, along with Luna, the scholars Lange et al. (2013) depart from 
labeling practices in defining vulnerable populations in biomedical research and 
emphasize the importance of the research design and the responsibilities of 
investigators in defining vulnerabilities in each particular research context. 
In line with these concepts of vulnerability, Hurst (2008) proposes a shift from the 
focus on population groups as carriers of vulnerability to a focus on research 
contexts and study designs that can impose or exacerbate vulnerability. In 
biomedical studies, Hurst (2008) argues, it is important to know what vulnerabilities 
the process of research can impose on potential participants rather than the intrinsic 
vulnerabilities of participants themselves. She defines vulnerability as “an 
identifiably increased likelihood of additional greater wrong” that may be imposed 
on a population through the research process (Hurst, 2008: 195). This definition 
does not imply vulnerability as an embodied characteristic of a particular group, but 
rather it requires conditional analyses of whether some particular research (e.g. 
research protocol, methodology) threatens a particular population group, and 
whether this group requires additional protection. Hurst reformulated the question 
about vulnerability from “What is vulnerability?” to “What makes people vulnerable?” 
For instance, when conducting a biomedical study, part of its process is to obtain 
written informed consent from potential participants. In research focusing on 
women’s health, it is general practice that researchers obtain consent directly from 
a woman. However, if this study is conducted in Afghanistan, for example, 
researchers may impose a particular level of risk on a woman, if they ask her for 
consent, while avoiding asking for permission from her surrogates, which could be 
a husband, brother, or father. While it may seem to be unethical to ask for consent 
for a competent adult from her surrogates, this practice may be rooted in the culture 
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of a particular community. Negation of this culture may harm a research participant. 
Therefore, more flexible and context-dependent research methodology is needed. 
In this context, the question of vulnerability may be further re-formulated as the 
following: What aspects of the research design may exacerbate or create 
vulnerability among a particular population group? 
For my analysis of refugee research, I will follow the critique provided by Hurst 
(2008) and Luna (2009), referring to vulnerability as a conditional and contextual 
notion rather than an embodied characteristic of a group. I agree with the 
aforementioned authors that we should reformulate the question of vulnerability and 
explore the nuances of research processes and designs that may make people 
vulnerable. As noted by Lange et al. (2013), researchers have responsibilities to 
identify vulnerability and avoid it wherever possible, while increasing the autonomy 
of research participants. However, the critique that was provided for the concept of 
layers of vulnerability is also applicable to these two concepts. The aforementioned 
authors propose a re-configuration of the concept of vulnerability in a more flexible 
and context-depended manner. They propose focusing on the potential of a 
research design to create vulnerability, rather than on the intrinsic vulnerabilities of 
individuals. The actors who are supposed to make judgments about research 
designs are investigators, who, as was demonstrated with the examples of the 
microbiologists and nurses, themselves may have different ideas about 
vulnerabilities and express different perspectives when looking at research 
processes.  
An important actor that may help to overcome this complexity is ethical 
committees that have to assess and judge research designs. Ethical committees act 
as safeguards, have to objectively determine the vulnerabilities of potential 
participants, and decide whether a particular research design is appropriate for the 
inclusion of these participants. However, ethical committees rarely have enough 
resources to conduct proper investigations regarding the opinions of different actors 
in research, which may also be time-consuming. Therefore, I propose to integrate 
elements of a participatory approach in the process of designing and performing 
biomedical research itself. Participation means that we integrate different angles 
together to judge vulnerability, including the experiences and expectations of the 
people who are exposed to these vulnerabilities. 
In general, the voices of refugees in different studies are represented by others, 
including either researchers, UN agencies and NGO representatives, or 
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governments of host countries. Another alternative is that refugees’ voices are not 
represented at all and therefore refugees’ issues are not acknowledged in a political 
and social agenda.  
For example, in the study of antimicrobial resistance, some refugees were 
positive about biomedical research and expressed their willingness to participate in 
such studies. However, only one out of six refugees could distinguish the practices 
of research from clinical care. Another five people mixed these two practices, 
demonstrating a therapeutic misconception. One of the refugees explained, “It 
[research] would be helpful for me, I can take care about myself. If there is 
something bad with me, researcher will tell me” (Ammar, 28). 
Refugees justify biomedical research, however they do it based on clinical care 
ethics, implying that research will benefit their personal health. One of the refugee 
participants explained his willingness to participate in AMR research by his 
perception of research as a preventive measure for his own health.  
If person has something wrong they [researchers] try to fix it, they are trying to make him better. 
… Research is for the person. They will do research to know what medicine is good for the person. 
… If someone has something not good they will try to get him better, to get him in a hospital, it 
[research] is better for us (Modar, 24). 
On the one hand, it is possible to argue that the therapeutic misconception 
demonstrated by refugees is an important obstacle to receiving informed consent 
and to conducting biomedical research involving these populations. On the other 
hand, this misunderstanding may be seen as a kind of moral claim about the 
incorporation of values and meanings of refugees into a larger body of a research 
design that would acknowledge their claim for care within the research.  
In the previous chapter, I examined how the concept of vulnerability is presented 
in the Belmont Report. Aiming to protect potentially vulnerable population groups, 
often through their exclusion from a research, the Belmont Report creates a space 
for a hard paternalism that presupposes that researchers, physicians or ethics 
committee take actions and make decisions on the behalf of patients or research 
participants “without their participation” (Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1987: 25).  In this 
chapter, I analyzed three theories that suggest a shift from paternalistic labeling 
concept of vulnerability to a more sensitive and participatory concept. However, 
these theories have their own limitations and constitute a risk to accumulate a lot of 
power on the hands of researchers. In the next chapter, I will propose a participatory 
approach as a possible research design that allows for dialogue between different 
participants and helps to create a contextual framework of vulnerability constructed 
through the expectations of different research actors. Through participation, while 
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pursuing larger public health goals, researchers involve participants in dialogue 
about their individual issues and worries.  
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Chapter 4. Participatory approach: working through vulnerability 
beyond the Belmont Report 
Participatory approach has been widely adopted in studies in the fields of 
anthropology and ethnography as a methodology for learning about peoples’ 
experiences and stories through their own words and meanings. In this chapter, I 
will propose an adaptation of participatory approach as a methodology for 
biomedical research involving refugees. This methodology will help to contextualize 
the issue of vulnerability while avoiding hard paternalism and at the same time 
empowering refugees by granting them more autonomy in the decision-making 
regarding their participation in research.  
Participatory research is a methodology that is based on “reflection, data 
collection, and action that aims to improve health and reduce health inequalities 
through involving people who, in turn, take action to improve their own health” 
(Baum et al., 2006). There are a number of principles that characterize participatory 
methodology. Although these principles were developed by the International 
HIV/AIDS alliance (2006) to work with HIV positive people, they can be adapted in 
order to work with vulnerable groups in general:  
 The principle of participation identifies the right of all people to actively 
participate and influence decisions that can affect their lives; 
 Empowerment is the process of increasing the influence and capacity of 
persons to decide on their own behalf and to perform actions they think will 
be the best for them; 
 The principle of collaboration refers to the idea of coproduction of knowledge 
in order to understand a problem and find a common solution to solve it; 
 Use of different visual and verbal techniques can allow people with different 
backgrounds to participate equally in complex analysis and learning; 
 Inclusion of people who are usually silent in the decision-making process. 
In the subsection 4.1., I will demonstrate how the participatory approach was 
originally applied in anthropology and I will then highlight how it can enrich 
biomedical studies involving refugees.  
The subsection 4.2. is devoted to the analysis of the learning health system as 
an example of the combination of research and care in practice. The participatory 
approach may be a helpful instrument when working with potentially vulnerable 
groups, because this approach shifts the researcher-subject relationship to a softer 
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doctor-patient relationship. However, this shift raises another important question 
that was sensitive in the Belmont Report, the separation of research and care. One 
the one hand, an association of research and care can benefit research participants 
who usually do not receive clear health benefits when taking part in biomedical 
studies that focus on the health of future patients. On the other hand, this mergence 
may fuel a problem associated with therapeutic misconception that can eventually 
lead to the exploitation of research participants. The learning health system was 
adopted in the US and is focused on combining research practices and care within 
hospitals. Working with the experience of this system, I will show how a participatory 
approach can help to narrow the gap between clinical care and public health ethics, 
while decreasing therapeutic misconception. 
4.1. Participatory methodology in anthropological research 
Two of the fields where participatory approach plays a significant role are 
anthropology and ethnography. Anthropologists use participation to gain an in-depth 
understanding of the local community that they are studying. Lassiter (2005: 16) 
developed an approach of collaborative2 ethnography and defines it as “an 
approach to ethnography that deliberately and explicitly [emphasis in original] 
emphasizes collaboration at every point in the ethnographic process, without veiling 
it—from project conceptualization, to fieldwork, and, especially, through the writing 
process.” A distinctive feature of anthropology and ethnography is that participation 
starts from the initial stages of research. A researcher can come to a community 
without any preliminary research questions or theoretical frameworks. 
Anthropologists work in collaboration with populations to identify research problems 
and questions that they will study and analyze together.  
In one of his works, Lassiter (2008: 71)  points out that participatory action 
research “plants roots in locality, and assembles cooperative cocitizenships and 
coactivisms built on the counderstandings emergent in the collaborative research 
partnerships between and among anthropologists and local publics”. The process 
of knowledge production in collaborative ethnography has a very flexible nature. 
Rather than one-sided interpretations by researchers, knowledge in participatory 
research is a result of collaboration between researchers and local participants. This 
approach can provide an opportunity to gain an in-depth understanding of a 
community’s problems and meanings through the insights of this community. 
                                                          
2 For the purpose of this thesis terms collaborative and participatory used as synonyms 
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Working with local meanings, anthropologists aim to understand essential health 
problems in the way they are perceived in a community. For example, doing 
participatory-action research in HIV/AIDS among young men in the industrial area 
of India, the Deepak Charitable Trust found that: 
AIDS itself was not perceived as a major problem by the young men in this area. Instead, men 
who were engaging in high-risk behaviors wanted to find sex partners at least partly to avoid 
“thinning of the semen” and sexual dysfunction and fatigue, which were believed to be long-term 
consequences of masturbation and nocturnal emissions (Minkler, 2005: ii6).  
Therefore, local understandings can redirect the focus of a research study and 
illuminate local complexities that would otherwise be ignored or simply unknown in 
a non-participatory study.  
It is accepted in anthropology that lay knowledge and traditions can govern the 
research process. Negotiations of different and often diverse attitudes and agendas 
are an important challenge in collaborative ethnography. It is obvious that outsider-
researcher and insider-laypersons can have different standpoints regarding 
research objectives. In cases when it is impossible to come to a common decision, 
anthropologists can emphasize the distinction in opinions, as this is also an 
important result for a collaborative study. For instance, describing the study “I Was 
Content and Not Content: The Story of Linda Lord and the Closing of Penobscot 
Poultry”, the ethnographer Alicia Rouverol (2003) points out the disagreement that 
appears during her dialogues with the participant. Rouverol emphasizes this 
disagreement in order to illustrate a dynamic of collaboration with the participant, 
and to show that common meanings are not always in place in participatory 
research.  
Our key area of disagreement . . . was in the question of what businesses owe communities when 
they shut down. I believe that some sort of restitution is in order when long-time businesses close 
and leave a community that is significantly dependent on that industry for its livelihood. Linda 
believes that businesses do not necessarily owe a community anything when they leave. We 
chose to include in the book’s edited interviews our exchange on this point, to draw attention to 
our differing perspectives (Rouverol, 2003: 66-67).  
The process of negotiation that can result in an unresolvable disagreement is 
still a successful result that emphasizes the deep distinction between outsider 
and insider understandings of the same problem. Working in participation with 
research subjects, investigators have to acknowledge participants’ attitudes 
towards a particular problem, but they also have to express their own attitudes 
and disagreements. 
In her work, Rouverol (2003) raises the important question of “shared 
authority” in collaborative research. Neither researchers nor participants are on 
the “top” of the research process, but they co-influence and co-shape each 
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other’s attitudes, as was the case with Rouverol’s study. Rouverol (2003: 67) 
points out that “Her [Linda’s] stance toward plant closure, its effects on workers, 
and the government’s responsibility, had become more critical, strident even, 
since Steve and Cedric’s interviews with her five years earlier. And this shift 
seemed important to include”. Therefore, not only researchers can change their 
attitudes through the process of participation, but also participants can re-think 
their understandings of some problems.   
An important distinction and one of the unique features of participatory action 
research is its spiral structure. In anthropology, researchers collaborate with 
participants at all levels of research, including the analysis of interviews and writing 
of reports. This structure provides a possibility for an in-depth understanding of local 
attitudes, and involves participants as active collaborators who both share and 
analyze information.  
Participatory methodology has been widely accepted by anthropologists who 
study health issues in different communities. This approach gives an opportunity for 
participants to express their own worries and beliefs during the research process, 
and also helps researchers acquire detailed knowledge through continuous 
communication. Such a methodology would be particularly helpful in working with 
vulnerable population groups. Through participation in research, human subjects 
can exercise their autonomy, which would not be limited to the process of informed 
consent, but rather expanded to the whole research process. The expansion of the 
principle of respect for autonomy plays a significant role in the next subsection. In 
the following section, I will focus on the learning health system, which aims to blur 
the boundaries between researcher-subject and doctor-patient relationships. This 
example will help us to understand how we can incorporate participatory 
methodology into a process of biomedical research, while decreasing possible 
therapeutic misconceptions.    
4.2. Learning health system: merging research with care  
The period between the production of new healthcare technology and its 
implementation often takes up to 17 years (Budrionis & Bellika, 2016).  As a result, 
patients receive care that was established 20 years ago and often do not have 
access to newly developed techniques and treatments. The learning healthcare 
system (LHS) aims to narrow this gap and thus bring a laboratory to the consultancy 
room and vice versa. In this system, science may learn directly from practice and 
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practice may apply new scientific knowledge in a shorter period. The learning health 
system is: 
designed to generate and apply the best evidence for the collaborative healthcare choices of each 
patient and provider; to drive the process of discovery as a natural outgrowth of patient care; and 
to ensure innovation, quality, safety, and value in health care (Olsen et al., 2007: ix).  
The learning health system offers doctors the double position of practitioner and 
researcher at the same time. Simultaneously, it transforms patients into potential 
research subjects. For example, a patient that has a gastric ulcer receives an 
established standard treatment for this medical condition in a hospital. A physician 
may offer this patient to participate in a study in a hospital to test an alternative 
treatment method that might be better than the standard one, although there is no 
evidence of this yet. If the patient agrees, they would simultaneously be in two 
dimensions of care and research, while still being within the same facility. LHS has 
three major aims (Budrionis & Bellika, 2016): 
1. To quicken the process of implementation of produced knowledge in clinical 
practice; 
2. To enhance a culture of shared responsibility; 
3. To engage doctors and patients with the processes of evidence production 
and implementation.  
A distinctive feature of the learning healthcare system is its incorporation of 
clinical research within routine clinical practice. Although LHS aims to blur the line 
between research and care, some authors, such as Kelley et al (2015), emphasize 
the centrality of physician-patient relationships and shared decision making 
principles. As LHS presupposes the inclusion of research practices into care, 
however, the question of informed consent becomes an important issue. The 
learning health system does not just substitute researcher-subject relationships with 
doctor-patient ones, but conjoin them. This aspect of LHS is crucial for an 
understanding of the participatory approach in biomedical studies, as the question 
is how to blur the line between research and care, while still maintaining a distinction 
between these two practices.  
Shared decision-making (SDM) is central to the learning health system. It is a 
process of collaboration between patients and their physicians regarding the 
process of treatment, or patients’ participation in research within clinical settings 
(Barry & Edgman-Levitan, 2012). SDM means the exchange of valuable information 
between a patient and a physician. Physicians have to share available information 
about treatment options, or possible benefits and harms that research may cause a 
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patient. In response, patients have to be open about their values, attitudes, and 
preferences about research and care. Therefore, a patient and a physician together 
can come to a common decision about treatment trajectories, or about the necessity 
of participation in a particular biomedical study. Through shared decision-making, 
therapeutic and research practices become more transparent and flexible. Patients 
can negotiate and correct their treatment together with physicians, thus sharing the 
responsibility of such decisions (Barry & Edgman-Levitan, 2012). Kelley et al (2015: 
13) argue that SDM facilitates collaboration between patients and physicians by 
bridging “the power gap between patient and physician knowledge while promoting 
transparency and trust,” which is essential to the learning health system. 
Guiding the process of decision-making through collaborations between patients 
and their physicians, SDM provokes an ethical challenge in healthcare practices, 
the shift from an evidence-based to a values-based practice (Williamson, 2014). 
This is a transformation of therapeutic decisions from evidence and scientific 
centered to individual and person-centered. This transformation is essential, 
especially in certain spheres of clinical practice, such as prenatal screening, 
discontinuation of active treatment toward the end of life, or the use of hormone 
replacement therapy. Patients transformed from silent recipients of doctors’ 
decisions to active players in the decision-making process.  
Although the ideas of the learning healthcare system seem attractive in that they 
can empower patients and give them direct access to the results of clinical trials, 
implementation of this system brings up the important questions of autonomy and 
trust. These questions are decisive cornerstones in shared decision making, as 
physicians make an offer of research participation based on the information patients 
provide to them. In addition, patients make their autonomous decisions based on 
the information provided to them by physicians. On the one hand, collaboration 
facilitates shared decision making and provides a possibility for both patients and 
practitioners to exercise their autonomy. On the other hand, uncritical trust can also 
provoke a number of risks for both patients and physicians. Referring to Emanuel & 
Emanuel (1992), Williamson (2014) argues that in healthcare practice it is almost 
impossible to grant full autonomy to patients, as they may lack important medical 
and biological knowledge. Thus their decisions would still require expert assistance:  
When it is understood as independence, autonomy has little normative content to help people 
work through difficult issues. It suggests people should be allowed to choose freely, but provides 
no assistance on what they should or ought to best select—that is, the view that autonomy 
amounts to noninterference or “self-understanding . . . excludes evaluative judgment of the 
patient’s values or attempts to persuade the patient to adopt other values” (Williamson, 2014: 9). 
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Autonomy implies non-interference. Thus a clinician has to accept an 
autonomous patient’s decision without judging this decision or persuading the 
patient to change it. In practice, however, patients rarely experience independent 
autonomy, as their decisions are usually influenced by the recommendations and 
judgments of doctors they trust. In their research about patient perspectives of the 
learning healthcare system, Kelley et al (2015) show the centrality of trusting patient-
physician relationships in making decisions about participation in research. 
Patients identified trust as a core value that motivated their views on how research risk should be 
managed, suggesting that perceptions of minimal risk might vary depending on the trusting nature 
of the physician–patient relationships. … from the patients’ perspective trust is a way to navigate 
risk, it is only a successful strategy when trusted persons or institutions uphold expectations and 
are trustworthy (Kelley et al, 2015:12). 
 However, the uncritical trust patients may grant their physicians can provoke a 
risk of violating a patient’s autonomy and persuasion in decision-making. Indeed, if 
the researcher and the physician are the same person, it would be difficult for a 
patient to separate them. It may become problematic to separate their advice 
regarding treatment trajectories and  research participation. Shared decision making 
is only possible through collaboration and trust between patients and their 
physicians. On the one hand, shared decision-making has the capacity to expand 
patients’ autonomy, allowing them to influence the treatment process. On the other 
hand, it creates a risk of violating this autonomy through the notion of uncritical trust.  
In addition, although the learning health system presupposes that patients and 
practitioners are equal collaborators in the process of decision-making, it is almost 
impossible for this to happen in practice. The physician always occupies the position 
of an expert who has a special education and experience, and who patients are 
used to trusting regarding their health. Examples from anthropology show us that 
researchers and participants can become equal partners through the process of 
research. However, long-term collaborative relationships between patients and 
physicians only strength the inequality of their positions. A physician is a person who 
possesses expert medical knowledge, experience, and the legal position of an 
expert. This important distinction once again emphasizes the possible risks of 
coercion and exploitation that may appear in trusting relationships in the learning 
healthcare system. In the next chapter, I will demonstrate how we can address the 
issue of trust within the context of biomedical research involving refugees.  
In this section, I introduced two different fields where the principles of the 
participatory approach and collaboration are applied. Anthropology proposes full 
cooperation with participants at all stages of research. Shared decision-making is a 
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process of involving patients as active participants in decision-making regarding 
their treatment or participation in research in the learning health system. These 
areas of knowledge present different ways of applying the participatory approach. 
Learning from these two fields, in the next chapter, I will define the possibilities and 
limitations that participatory methodology can offer biomedical research involving 
vulnerable populations, particularly refugees.  
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Chapter 5. Participatory action research: possibilities and 
limitations 
After a general description of the participatory approach provided in the previous 
chapter, chapter five will scrutinize how the participatory approach can be adapted 
for biomedical studies involving refugees. I will show how this approach can on the 
one hand empower refugees and enhance their autonomy, but on the other hand, I 
will also highlight a weakness of this approach that may lead to the exploitation of 
research participants due to their uncritical trust to researchers.  
Participatory methodology aims to empower research participants, or patients in 
the case of the learning health system, and to engage them in the process of 
decision-making. Because of these aims, participatory methodology is an appealing 
tool for scholars working with vulnerable populations. For example, Holkup et al 
(2004) adapt the participatory approach in their study with a Native American 
Community. Another scholar, Veale (2005), proposes participation in research with 
children. In addition, participatory methodology has been widely adopted by 
scholars working with refugee populations. For instance, Marlowe (2009; 2013) 
applied the participatory approach in his study of the traumatic experiences of 
Sudanese refugees in New Zealand. I will rely on this example to demonstrate the 
limits and benefits that the participatory approach can offer biomedical studies 
involving refugees.  
Marlowe (2009; 2013)  conducted a three-year research project that included in-
depth narratives with 24 Sudanese men and an ethnographic engagement with their 
community. He performed participatory action research in order to build 
communication and trust with people who experienced forced migration. He wanted 
to understand refugees’ experiences and values in their own terms.  
Every communication consists of a minimum of two people, a speaker and a 
listener. As Marlowe notes, however, this translation of information becomes more 
complex when the discussion is loaded with social, historical, cultural, and political 
gaps between the speaker and the listener. Refugee populations are a very 
sensitive subject for research, as they represent both local cultural norms and 
traditions, and the experience of trauma associated with forced migrations. To build  
communication with these people, a researcher has to understand their cultural 
background. 
 The traditional methods of conducting interviews with the use of a questioner 
and limited communication with respondents, do not always allow for a deep 
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understanding of what is said by people from different cultures. Therefore, the 
translation of meaning from a participant to a researcher may not be clear, and 
results obtained by these studies can be insufficient or even wrong in their 
representations of participants. Marlowe emphasizes that the life experiences of 
refugees are often characterized by the notion of trauma and threat, which can lead 
to two problems with traditional interview methods.  
1. Respondents can feel fear or shame in telling the truthful story of their 
lives, or they can distrust researchers. Therefore, it may lead to a risk of 
insufficient or even incorrect information, if respondents do not feel 
comfortable enough to disclose their actual stories. 
2. Refugees may report only the traumatic experiences of forced migration, 
while denying other stories from their lives that could emphasize very 
different notions of what this person actually values and thinks. Although 
many refugees have painful experiences regarding their migration, it would 
be incorrect to narrow a person only to this background, while denying 
other stories and parts of their lives.  
Thus, when doing research with refugees, it is essentially important “to meet 
these people on their terms in both time and place rather than from territory of the 
often more powerful positions and perspectives that we command and enjoy” 
(Marlowe, 2009: 45). Marlowe articulates that researchers have to “play an integral 
role in elevating people’s voices in a collaborative manner that acknowledges who 
these people are and importantly, who they want to be” (Marlowe, 2009: 46).  
A traumatic experience in itself is not a specific characteristic of refugee 
populations. Traumatic experiences can also be relevant to other vulnerable groups 
of people, such as people infected with HIV. However, I would argue that studies 
involving refugees are inherently different from those involving other vulnerable 
population groups. When studying vulnerable groups of people within one 
community, researchers do not actually move to completely different normative and 
cultural contexts. For example, if we perform research involving women from our 
society who experienced domestic violence, we will not delve into a completely new 
cultural framework with its own meanings and symbols. Although these women are 
vulnerable, they exist within the same social discourse as we do, and we can 
communicate with them using mutually understandable terminology. The unique 
feature of refugees and migrants in general, is that they bring one context within 
another. If we perform research involving refugees, we cannot rely on the 
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terminology that is accepted in our society. Instead we have to construct a new one 
that will be understood by both refugees and researchers. The responsibility of 
investigators in refugee research is to translate and mitigate two different contexts 
that exist in one place with researchers from a host country and refugees from 
another country.   
Marlowe proposes that researchers should actively engage with the studied 
community and involve the community in active participation in the research. In his 
article, he refers to the term “slowly slowly” that was widely used by his respondents 
(Marlowe, 2013). This expression, “slowly slowly,” may serve as a good 
representation of the core principles of participatory action research. Participatory 
studies develop in a spiraling way during which the researcher, in collaboration with 
refugees, gradually determines the “authentic backstage responses” and local 
knowledge (Marlowe, 2009: 45). Doing participatory action research means 
recognizing that “people are experts of their own lives and that it is necessary to 
understand people beyond the problems they are encountering” (Marlowe, 2013: 
157). This understanding can be done through collaborative work with people whose 
stories we study.  
The benefits of participatory action research can extend beyond the framework 
of the research itself. To illustrate this point I will rely on the example of the 
participation effect from a water project in an expanded program of immunization 
(EPI) (Eng et al., 1990). During their project, Eng et al test the following hypothesis: 
Communities which participate in decision-making throughout all phases of a water supply project 
[project took place in villages in Togo and Indonesia] will display higher rates of participation in 
other primary health care activities such as EPI that communities with have either a non-
participatory water supply project or no water supply project at all (Eng et al., 1990: 1350).  
Interestingly, this hypothesis was statistically proven. Based on the data on 
diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT) immunization series, Eng et al concluded 
that villages that were part of a participatory water supply project had approximately 
10% higher DPT series completion rates than villages with non-participatory project 
groups and in control groups where no water supply project took place. 
Participatory action research can bring benefits not only within the framework of 
the research, but can also expand its influence throughout time. Therefore, this 
research has a capacity to empower research participants from a long-term 
perspective. Through participation in research as active players, community 
members are shaped and influenced by this research and learn how to take active 
positions and express their own thoughts and beliefs.  
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Although the participatory approach is an appealing instrument, it has a number 
of limitations that have to be considered carefully. The first limitation is rooted in 
contextuality. Although researchers should obtain inside cultural knowledge and 
implement it into the research process, it may be problematic to do so in some 
situations. In particular, certain local cultural and religious principles possessed by 
participants can be recognized as unethical and thus cannot be fulfilled. For 
example, in some cultures women are not treated as equal to men. This does not 
mean, however, that in a study, women’s voices should be less valid then that of 
men. In addition, in the case of refugees, people come from distinct cultural and 
legal frameworks. Therefore, some traditional principles that may be valuable for 
refugees can be illegal in host countries.  
Second, participatory approach raises an important question of critical trust 
between participants and researchers. As it was discussed in the previous chapter, 
collaborative research in anthropology, as well as shared decision-making within the 
learning health system, require trusting relationships between actors. The 
participatory approach implies continuous communication between researchers and 
participants that supposed to combine benefits of clinical care and public health 
ethics. This combination leads to the merging of roles of the researcher and the 
doctor. However, the doctor-patient relationship are rather paternalistic and require 
that patients grant a sufficient amount of trust on their physicians. At the same time, 
the researcher-subject relationship is inherently different in nature and require 
critical judgements of researchers by subjects. On the one hand, it is possible to 
suggest that the aim of the participatory approach is to build trusting communication 
between researchers and participants and, therefore, this trust will protect 
participants from possible exploitation. On the other hand, as O’Neill (2002: 18) 
rightly noticed it, the suggestion that trust will protect research subjects is naïve. 
Participation can be seen as a form of beneficence as it contributes to the 
enhancement of refugees’ autonomy in making decisions regarding their 
participation in biomedical studies (Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1987). Autonomy is a 
precondition of trust, therefore the process of communication in the participatory 
approach has to be devoted to the enhancement of autonomy in order to build critical 
trust that is different from blind trust. Therefore, when we speak about trust in 
biomedical research, it is a “reflective” and “self-confident” trust (Solomon & Flores, 
2003). This kind of authentic trust is different from blind trust by its recognition of 
possibilities for disillusion and its caution for possible treachery. Solomon & Flores 
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(2003: 92) define authentic trust as “trust that is well aware of the risks, dangers, 
and liabilities of trust, but maintains the self‐confidence to trust nevertheless.” 
Another author, O’Neill (2002: 193), emphasizes that the notion of trust implies “risk 
taking”; people have to put their trust in researchers or caretakers “without 
guarantees”.   
The building of authentic trust is based, as was highlighted by Sutrop (2007), on 
information. Indeed, in order to make an autonomous decision and to put trust in 
researchers or institutions that fund a particular study, or to a government that 
supports it, an individual needs a sufficient amount of information about these actors 
and research itself. As was noted by the same author, the foundation for blind trust 
is a “lack of information and critical thinking” (Sutrop, 2007: 196). Therefore, 
authentic trust has to be rooted in information and critical reflection on this 
information.  
However, it would be premature to conclude that the provision of sufficient 
information is enough to build trusting relationships between researchers and 
research participants. In her book on autonomy and trust, O’Neill (2002: 25) 
emphasizes that “trust is most readily placed in others whom we can rely on to take 
our interests into account, to fulfil their roles, to keep their parts in bargains”. This 
argument consist of two very important points. First, trust is associated with both 
information about research, and also with information about the competence of 
those who are performing a given study. This point was also highlighted by Sutrop 
(2007: 192), who argued that in order to put their trust in someone, individuals have 
“to believe that another will be able to do” her work professionally. Second, in order 
to take part in a study and to build trusting communication with researchers, people 
have to believe that researchers will take their interests seriously. This point is of 
great importance. The provision of information that is usually a part of the process 
of informed consent does not grant the creation of participants’ trust in researchers, 
if they, an institution they represent, or a government in general are not trusted by 
the population.  
In their work, Solomon & Flores (2003: 92) argue that “in authentic trust it is the 
relationship itself that is the focus of attention.” This is the relationship between 
different actors involved in the process of research, including potential participants, 
researchers, nurses, institutions, and government bodies. If there were no trust 
between certain of these actors, it would be very difficult to involve participants in a 
study. For example, when I conducted an ethnographic study in an asylum center 
41 
 
in Maastricht, refugees were willing to talk with me and be interviewed by me, 
although I was not part of the medical team conducting AMR screenings and I am 
not Dutch. Not that many people, however, were willing to give their stool samples 
for microbiological analysis. Although all of the samples were anonymized, many 
refugees expressed concern that the results of microbiological tests could influence 
their status as refugees and that they may not receive a residence permit. I think 
that this concern was rooted in the deep distrust that refugees have in host countries 
in general, and in researchers as their representatives in particular.  
The provision of sufficient information in biomedical study is not enough for the 
creation of trusting relationships between researchers and participants. As was 
emphasized by O’Neill (2002), there is a need for trustworthy institutions that 
support and conduct biomedical studies. I would also add that another requirement 
for the building of trust is time. The expression “slowly slowly,” which appeared in 
the research conducted by  Marlowe (2013), can serve as a good example of this 
requirement. In order to build trust with research participants, who may be skeptical 
about the whole institution conducting the study, researchers have to spend a 
sufficient amount of time developing authentic trust among participants. This notion 
of time will be further discussed in the next subsection where I will propose a way 
to rethink the methodology of biomedical research in order to make it more flexible 
and responsive in refugee research. Participatory methodology can be helpful here. 
In this section, I demonstrated the way that the participatory approach can be 
applied to vulnerable populations and in particular to refugees. To be able to grasp 
and understand local beliefs, researchers have to involve refugees in research as 
partners and collaborators. Although participatory research may require a significant 
amount of time, it can bring additional benefits to both participants and researchers. 
One of the biggest obstacles in applying the participatory approach to biomedical 
studies is the limits of trust. On the one hand, trusting communication can introduce 
significant benefits. On the other hand, it can provoke a risk of exploitation of 
potentially vulnerable population. In the following subsection, I propose a design for 
biomedical research involving refugees that will address the complexities 
associated with the vulnerability of refugees, trusting communication, and risks of 
exploitation.  
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5.1. Participatory methodology for biomedical research involving 
refugees 
The perception of research subjects as experts on their own lives has the 
potential capacity to enrich research processes with insights, meanings, and 
experiences. In particular, laypersons’ knowledge can help an investigator to better 
understand how to properly and ethically perform a study involving vulnerable 
populations, such as refugees. For example, if a study focuses on the processes of 
HIV dissemination among people living in a refugee camp, investigators have to 
know what these people understand as a sexual contact (e.g. in some cultures it is 
believed that anal sex is not sexual contact, and thus some people may not report 
that they have these practices). In order to acquire truthful reports from people, 
researchers have to know local understandings about sexual contact and HIV. In 
order to obtain this knowledge, they must first establish trusting communication.  
In the previous subsection, it was demonstrated that building trusting 
communication within the framework of biomedical research could be a challenging 
issue. Inclusion of refugees adds an additional constraint, as, due to their increased 
vulnerability, refugees may distrust any official representative of a host country, 
including investigators. Based on the principles of participatory methodology, I will 
propose a two-layer design for conducting biomedical studies involving refugees. 
This methodology will allow us to contextualize the possible vulnerabilities of 
refugees, enhance their autonomous reasoning, and avoid possible therapeutic 
misconceptions. The first layer can be understood as a broadening of the process 
of informed consent. It aims to construct trusting communication between 
researchers and participants, and to develop an appropriate methodology and tools 
for the second layer.  The second layer is the performance of the biomedical study, 
which includes collection of biomedical materials. Each of the layers has to be 
separately approved by an ethics committee. After the first stage is concluded, 
researchers have to prove to the ethics committee that they fulfill their obligations 
and spent a sufficient amount of time with potential subjects that allowed building of 
an authentic trust. The second layer has to be based on the results obtained during 
the first phase. Let us describe this scheme in more detail.  
The first layer represents the core of the participatory methodology. It can be 
seen as a separate ethnographic study that has two major aims: 
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1. The introduction of researchers and their interests to potential participants 
and vice versa. During this introduction, researchers have to state that 
their research interests are different from care, and have to discuss 
possible vulnerabilities that may appear in the biomedical study. 
2. The development of research methodology and acceptable forms of 
informed consent for a future biomedical study that will involve the same 
population group.  
This study has to gain separate approval from an ethics committee. In this phase, 
researchers have to take on the role of ethnographers who have come to an 
unknown culture and have to understand its norms and traditions. During this time, 
researchers have to learn how to speak about particular issues, such as 
antimicrobial resistance for example, with these people, and have to build authentic 
trust with them. This part may be particularly challenging. There are, however, some 
helpful tools used in anthropology, which were discussed above. For example, 
researchers may invite participants to laboratories and introduce them to some basic 
algorithms they use at work. The most important part here is transparency. If 
researchers wish to build trusting communication and learn about individuals’ 
practices and beliefs, they have to let participants learn the same things about the 
researchers.  
It is clear that not all potential participants are interested in laboratory work or 
scientific goals. However, there are always some people who are sincerely curious 
about these things. These people should be actively involved in this first phase of 
research, as they may help to gain inside knowledge about the community. In 
addition, they could provide support for the study by gaining the trust of other 
members of a population group. Through the process of building trusting 
relationships, researchers, in collaboration with participants, have to develop 
adequate tools for the second stage of the study. In particular, they have to create 
an appropriate form of informed consent that could be understood by members of a 
population group, and develop other practical and behavioral rules for performing 
their biomedical study. Even such detail as, for example, wearing a white coat may 
be of a great importance in some communities. In our study with Syrian refugees, 
all the participants stated that they would never trust a medical researcher if he is 
not wearing a doctor’s white coat. This small detail may be an important element in 
the success of the whole study.  
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The second layer represents the conducting of a biomedical study, and has to 
receive separate justification from an ethics committee. Although this scheme may 
be time consuming, it can benefit both researchers and participants. The separation 
of a study into two different layers involves a particular sensitivity to potential, and 
possibly vulnerable, research participants. It gives a sense of respect to participants 
and may enhance their autonomous reasoning through active participation in the 
research process. It may also benefit researchers in that they can obtain more 
truthful and coherent data. In addition, although the first stage may be time 
consuming, the second phase of the study may be performed much faster and more 
smoothly. Indeed, if all of the methodology is already developed and researchers 
have already established contacts with potential participants, the biomedical 
aspects of a study can be performed in a short period.  
Conducting research involving refugees that are potentially vulnerable and often 
do not trust any representatives of a host country maybe a serious challenge for 
researchers. However, exclusion of this population group from biomedical studies 
can cause more harm as  to the health of these people as to the public health of the 
community. Indeed, the lack of medical or biological knowledge about some 
population group may cause harms not only to these individuals but also to public 
health, as in the case of contagious diseases. This two-layered participatory 
methodology may help to alleviate some difficulties associated with the vulnerability 
of refugees. The process of building trust and the co-creation of a research 
methodology may help researchers to include refugees in biomedical study, while 
not creating or exacerbating their vulnerabilities. In addition, researchers will not 
gain too much power, as they will always have to prove to the ethics committee that 
they actually spent enough time with potential research participants. This approach 
understands the principle of respect for autonomy as a positive obligation and 
involves research participants in an active dialogue with researchers. At the same 
time, the first layer of such a methodology preserves a sufficient amount of time to 
define and discuss the possible vulnerabilities of participants with different research 
actors.  
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Conclusion 
At the beginning of this thesis, I argued that there is a need for re-configuring the 
concept of vulnerability as it is currently presented in ethical guidelines for 
biomedical research involving human subjects. The focus of my argument was a 
particular group that is usually recognized as vulnerable, refugees. Working with the 
classic notions of autonomy and jeopardized autonomy (i.e. vulnerability), I analyzed 
how this concept has been translated into research ethics and implemented in 
ethical guidelines, in particular in the Belmont Report.  
The way that the Belmont Report utilizes the concept of vulnerability has been 
called “labeling”. This means that the concept of vulnerability serves as a label that 
can be attached to different population groups. The practice of “labeling” has been 
widely criticized for its inflexibility and ignorance of contextual nuances that may 
surround different members of population groups. I referred to three groups of 
authors, Hurst (2008), Lange et al. (2013), and Luna (2009), in order to demonstrate 
several possible ways of rethinking “labeling” the concept of vulnerability in a more 
flexible way. However, these three concepts have a common problem; the definition 
of vulnerability in each of them depends on those who have a voice in the research 
(e.g. researchers, funding organization, nurses). Therefore, if researchers do no 
perceive refugees as vulnerable, they may not include necessary safeguards to 
protect these participants. In order to overcome this problem, I propose the 
implementation of a participatory methodology in the process of biomedical studies.  
The participatory approach aims to empower research participants. By applying 
this approach to biomedical studies and incorporating personal issues into public 
health research, we may enhance people’s understanding of health as a public 
phenomenon, as well as give them an opportunity to raise their individual health 
issues. Therefore, participation helps one to see and treat people beyond their 
perceived status as vulnerable individuals. This participatory structure can allow for 
the following benefits: 
 Through communication with potential participants, the researcher will be 
able to design a context-sensitive research program that will avoid the creation 
or exacerbation of vulnerabilities;  
 The empowerment of refugees through dialogue with researchers; 
 The incorporation of personal benefits, such as consultations with medical 
specialists, into biomedical research that is pursuing public health goals. 
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It has been demonstrated, however, that despite the definitive benefits that a 
participatory approach can offer to biomedical research involving refugees, this 
approach has some limitations. One such limitation is contained in the notion of trust 
between participants and researchers that may lead to the exploitation of human 
participants. In order to settle this problem, I offered a two-layered design for a  
biomedical study that can be seen as two separate studies. The first layer is devoted 
to the process of building trust and shaping communication, after the conclusion of 
this phase researchers will have to provide an evidence for ethics committee that 
they fulfill their obligations of trust building. During this stage, researchers, in 
collaboration with participants, have to develop forms of informed consent and 
appropriate tools for the second phase of research, which is the biomedical study 
itself. This design will allow researchers to solve problems related to mistrust and 
therapeutic misconceptions, as they involve refugees in a collaborative dialogue. In 
addition, such a methodology can help researchers to map possible vulnerabilities 
faced by refugees, while at the same time contributing to an empowerment of 
refugees who can raise their voices and make autonomous decisions. Although, the 
proposed approach can be time-consuming, I do not argue that it should become a 
universal standard for conducting biomedical research. However, the participatory 
approach is a helpful methodology to conduct biomedical studies in particular 
contexts, specifically with vulnerable population groups.   
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Summary 
The concept of vulnerability in biomedical research that involves refugees is of a 
contradictory nature. On the one hand, ethical guidelines, such as the Belmont 
Report, establish that refugees belong to a vulnerable population and require 
additional protection. On the other hand, the application of such guidelines in 
practice often leads to hard paternalism and an overall exclusion of refugees from 
biomedical studies and their possible benefits. In this thesis, I conducted a critical 
analysis of the concept of vulnerability in research ethics and proposed an approach 
to rethinking this concept in a more flexible way. I propose the implementation of 
participatory methodology, which is characterized by the inclusion of all research 
actors into a process of research development and performance, into the design of 
biomedical studies. I suggested that biomedical research with refugees should 
include two layers, or separate studies. First, biomedical research should include an 
ethnographic enquiry into the cultural meanings and values of a refugee group. 
During this stage, researchers have to build trust and communication with 
participants and develop responsive tools for the second stage of research, which 
is the biomedical study. This type of research design will allow for the respectful 
treatment of refugees and in-depth analyses of possible vulnerabilities that may be 
imposed by biomedical studies.  
 
 
Title in Estonian: Haavatavuse mõiste ümbermõtestamine: põgenike kaasamine 
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